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AN UNEVEN SCALE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT’S PROGRESSIVE VICTIM PROTCTION RULES IN THE LUBANGA TRIAL

Michael Rolek

On March 14, 2012, Thomas Lubanga became the first person tried and convicted by the
International Criminal Court (ICC). Lubanga was convicted for conscripting, enlisting and using
children under the age of fifteen years in hostilities within the Democratic Republic of Congo
(“DRC”).1

This conviction marked the first time that victims actively participated in an

international criminal trial, not as witnesses, but as a separate party with separate rights and
separate legal representation. In total, 129 individual victims were allowed to participate in the
proceeding pursuant to Article 68(3).2 Of these victims, three of them we able to express their
views during trial, not as supplemental evidence to the prosecution or defense, but as a separate
lens which the judges could approach the evidence in this case.3 Most alarming was that through
ICC statutes, these victims received the most extreme protection ever granted by an international
court to victims, specifically: (1) the ability to retain legal representation, and (2) the
discretionary power of the court to refrain from disclosing the identity of the victim to the
defense.
1

Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Summary of the Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Case
No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (March 14, 2012).
2
REDRESS, Thomas Lubanga Trial: Timeline of Victims’ Engagement. (March 14, 2012).
3
Article 68(3) of the ICC states: “Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the
Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial
to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. Such views and
concerns may be presented by the legal representatives of the victims where the Court considers
it appropriate, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”

These progressive provisions were included in the ICC due to a change in the way
victims were utilized in prosecuting international criminal defendants, a change in perception of
victims in the criminal setting, and the growing trend of employing restorative justice in the
criminal justice community. There have been articles and journal notes both critiquing and
praising the progressive victim rules of the ICC.4 This comment is unique in that it will examine
how the victim’s rules were practically applied to the Lubanga trial, the first ever trial and
conviction by the Court; and discuss how the Court should proceed with these laws in the future.
Using the Lubanga trial as a lens, this comment will discuss these pro-victim provisions within
the ICC, specifically the ability to have separate legal representation throughout the entire
proceeding and the ability to attain complete anonymity, are unnecessary and violate a
defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial as required in Article 68 and international due
process established in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).
The preamble in the ICC lists the eleven major principles of the ICC, including
recognizing that there are grave crimes that threaten the peace and well-being of the world,
putting an end and punishing these crimes and being conscious of the victims who have
suffered.5

The preamble demonstrates the inherent struggle between the ICC’s goal of

prosecuting offenders in a fair setting while simultaneously provide the victims of these

4

Elisabeth Baumgartner, Aspect of Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the International
Criminal Court, 90 International Review of the Red Cross 409 (June 2008); Sam Garkawe,
Victims and the International Criminal Court: Three Major Issues, 3 International Criminal Law
Review 345 (2003); Mina Rauschenbach and Damien Scalia, Victims and International Criminal
Justice: A Vexed Question, 90 International Review of the Red Cross 441 (June 2008); Mugambi
Jouet, Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the International
Criminal Court (July 18, 2007).
5
Preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9.
2

atrocities with the greatest security and rights possible.

This struggle stems from deeper

ideological struggle in criminal justice: restorative justice versus the classic, adversarial system.
Part I of this comment will provide a brief history of Thomas Lubanga and his trial and
conviction in the ICC. Part II(A) describes the history of victims in international courts, and how
victim participation in these proceedings have changed since the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military
Tribunals. Part II(B) gives an overview of the ICC’s progressive victims provisions. Part III(A)
discusses Rule 90 of the ICC which gives victims the ability to have legal representation, while
Part III(B) describes the impact on the Lubanga trial. Part III(C) examines how the ability for a
victim to have legal representation throughout the entire proceeding is unnecessary and violates
defendant’s due process.

Part IV(A) discuss the victim’s ability to be granted complete

anonymity, while Part IV(B) describes the impact it had on the Lubanga trial. Part IV(C)
discusses how this safeguard violates the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Finally, Part V is the
conclusion that summarizes the basic arguments of the comment and provides a brief instruction
on how the ICC should proceed with these victim provisions.

I. THE TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF THOMAS LUBANGA
In the early part of the 21st century, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) was
in political turmoil. Several political groups, specifically the Union des Patriots Congolais
(“UPC”), the Armee Populaire Congolaise (“APC”) and the Force de Resistance Patriotique en
Itrui (“FRPI”) engaged in internal armed conflict to gain power of the state. Thomas Lubanga
was one of the UPC’s founding members and the President from the outset.6 In September 2002,
he established the Force Patriotique pour la Liberation du Congo (“FLPC”), the military wing of

6

The Arrest of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. The American Non-Government Organizations
Coalition for the International Criminal Court. April 4, 2006.
3

the UPC.7 The UPC/FPLC was primarily composed of persons from the Hema ethnic group, and
is alleged to have been responsible for many massacres in the Ituri District of the DRC, most
notably the massacres involving the Lendu tribes.8
In March 2005, the DRC initially arrested Lubanga in connection with the assassination
of nine Bangldeshi soldiers of the UN peacekeeping force in the Congo. On February 10, 2006,
a sealed arrest warrant was officially issued by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I.9 On March 16,
2006, the Congolese authorities agreed to surrender Lubanga to the ICC, and on March 20, under
the authority of Judge Claude Jorda, Lubanga was informed of his rights under the Rome Statute
and officially charged with conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen in armed
conflicts.10 Trial commenced in January 2009, and after being stayed twice as a consequence of
disclosures and the validity of certain witnesses and intermediaries participating in the trial,
concluded in August 2011.11 On March 14, 2012, the ICC convicted Lubanga of conscripting
and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the FPLC and using them to participate
actively in hostilities within the meaning of Articles 8(2)(e)(vii) and 25(3)(a) of the Statute from
early September 2002 to August 12, 2003.12 He received a fourteen-year jail sentence, six of
which were previously served.
In total, 129 victims participated in the trial, and eight different legal representatives
represented them.13 The majority of these victims participated during the investigation and pre-

7

Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra, note 1.
The Arrest of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra, note 6.
9
Id. at 2.
10
Id. at 5.
11
Id. at 4.
12
Id.
13
The legal representatives of the victims included: Luc Walleyn, Franck, Mulenda, Carine
Bapite, Buyangandu, Joseph Keta Orwinyo, and Paul Kabongo Tshibangu.
8

4

trial periods.14 Three of these victims were able to present their views in court during trial.15
These victims became the first to be able take advantage of the opportunity to present their views
and concerns to the judges, not as representatives of the prosecution or defense, but as a separate
party on their own volition.16 Each victim was also afforded the ability to have complete
anonymity during the course of the trial. In total, these rights are the most extreme form of
protection ever granted to victims.
Although it is necessary to have safeguards in place in order to ensure a sufficient
prosecution and appropriate victim safety, these two provisions violate the defendant’s right to a
fair trial, and violates defendant’s due process. Victim protection is necessary and vital in the
ICC, however the protection granted to victims today in the ICC is too broad and a huge leap
from the level of protection victims were afforded at the inception of criminal tribunals
beginning at the end of World War II. In the advent of restorative justice, the ICC has lost focus
of the main propose of international courts: to try and convict the accused.

II. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S PROTECTION OF VICTIMS
In the first international criminal tribunals after World War II, victims were not afforded
many rights or paid that much attention. As time progressed victims have received greater

Article 15(3) states “If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed
with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the pre-trial chamber a request for authorization
of an investigation, together with any supporting material collected. Victims may make
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.”
15
In total, the Chamber heard sixty-seven witnesses: the prosecution called thirty-six, twentyfour called by the defense, four experts called by the Chamber and three by the victims.
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra, note 1.
16
Tracey Gurd, Why are Victims Testifying Now? www.lubangatrial.org. January 16, 2010.
Ultimately, however, the Chamber did not rely on the testimony due to material doubts of the
identity of two of the individuals. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra, note 1, pg. 5.
14

5

attention from advocacy groups and have been used more often in the prosecution of
international criminals, and as a result have received greater protection from international courts
and tribunals. However, the ICC’s protective measures, specifically the ability of victims to
have separate legal representation and the ability to receive total anonymity, goes beyond mere
“safeguards,” and instead, infringes upon the rights of the accused which threatens basic criminal
justice principals and the legitimacy of the Court.

A. History of the Treatment of Victim’s in International Criminal Tribunals and Courts
After World War II, the Allied commanders understood that a judicial body needed to be
created in order to handle the trial and convictions of members of the Axis forces that committed
various war crimes. The result were the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals, the first
international criminal tribunals of its kind. From 1945 through 1948 these Courts prosecuted
Nazi and Japanese leaders guilty of war crimes. Both of these courts gave little attention to the
role, rights and protection of victims,17 mainly because, these tribunals relied on documentation
and records to prosecute these war crimes.18
Soon thereafter in the 1960s, a new discipline of research dealing with the study of
victims began to take effect. Termed “victimology,” this discipline studied victims and their
reactions to the trauma they sustained and experienced. Soon experiments regarding treatment
for victims and investigations into the personal experiences victims had had with the criminal
justice system started to effect criminal courts, prompting domestic jurisdictions to take more
17

Founding Statutes in the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals made no
mention of the word “victim,” nor did it mention that victims or witnesses might have right to
protection and support.
18
Christine Chinkin, Due Process and Witness Anonymity, 91 The American Journal of
International Law 75 (Jan., 1997) (Numberg and Toyko was dependent upon eyewitness
testimony).
6

action regarding the protection of victims and their role in the judicial process.19 Over time the
study and focus on victims began to effect the international stage, culminating in 1985 when the
United Nations General Assembly unanimously agreed on the Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. This established victims’ rights to respect and dignity,
information about proceedings and the right to present their views and concerns.20 It also
recognized, at an international level, the right to reparations.
In the 1990s, following the atrocities in the conflicts in the Balkans and in Rwanda, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), respectively, took progressive steps in victims’ rights
including: establishing Victims and Witness Units (“VWU”) to assist and support victims
dealing with the tribunals;21 developing special measures for the protection of certain victims,
namely those of sexual assault; and allowing victim reparations. Despite these unprecedented
protective measures, many believed that more needed to be done.

The result was strong

lobbying for victims rights leading up to the Rome Conference in 1998, specifically over witness
care in judicial proceedings, and protective measures of victims.22 As a result the ICC, expanded

19

Sam Garkawe, Modern Victimolgy: Its Importance, Scope and Relationship with Criminology,
14(2) South African Journal of Criminology, 90-99 (2001).
20
United Nations General Assembly Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse
of Power (1985).
21
VWU would provide administrative, financial and practical arrangements to bring a witness
from their home to the Hauge. Also, provide emotional support, including counseling and
arranging medical and psychological care. See Rydberg A., The Protection of the Interests of
Witnesses – The ICTY in Comparison to the Future ICC. 12 Leiden Journal of International Law
455 at 462 (1999).
22
Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (January 1997 to December 2006)
described victims’ concerns as the “overriding interest” that drove the Rome conference. United
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15 – July 17, 1998 at p. 62.
7

upon victim rights, granting “victims an independent voice and role in proceeding before the
Court.”23

B. Progressive Protection to Victims by the ICC
The ICC defines victims as “natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”24 The term “natural person” has
been broadly defined to also include organizations, hospitals and historic monuments.25 In the
ICC, victims are active participants of international justice, rather than mere passive subjects. In
the ICC, their participation has become essential in every stage of the trial, as participation can
range “from petitioning the Court or volunteering information to applying for participant’s
status.”26
Although victims do have the broad ability to participate in judicial proceedings, there are
some procedural restrictions in place.

In order to participate, victims must make written

applications to the Court, and demonstrate a “personal interest” in the proceedings pursuant to
Article 68(3) and ICC’s Rule 89.27 If the Court accepts the application, the Chamber shall then

23

Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ICC-01/04-101-T), Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1-6, para 52 (January 17, 2006).
24
ICC Rule 85.
25
ICC Rule 85(b): “Victims may include organizations for institutions that have sustained direct
harm to any of their property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or
charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for
humanitarian purposes.”
26
Report of the Court on the Strategy in Relation to Victims (“ICC Strategy in Relation to
Victims”), ICC-ASP/8/45, November 10, 2009, para. 46.
27
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 89: “In order to present their views and concerns,
victims shall make written application to the Registrar, who shall transmit the application to the
relevant Chamber. Subject to the provisions of the Statute, in particular article 68, paragraph 1,
the Registrar shall provide a copy of the application to the Prosecutor and the defense, who shall
8

“specify the proceedings and manner in which participation is considered appropriate, which
may even include making opening and closing statements.”28
Despite the Court having broad discretion in victim participation, the Court is limited by
the requirement that victim participation must be appropriate and not prejudicial to or
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair, impartial and expeditious trial.29 This vital
clause located in Article 68, establishing the defendant’s right to a fair trial, is consistent with the
original purpose of the international courts: to have a body that can prosecute serious crimes
against humanity when national governments and domestic judicial systems are insufficient.30
The growing trend of pro-victim rights in the ICC, specifically the Court’s discretion to
not disclose the identity of a victim31 and the ability to provide victims the right to attain legal
representation,32 are grounded in a principle called restorative justice. The goal of restorative
justice is to encourage dialogue and reconciliation between victims, perpetrators and the
community.33 What restorative justice fails to consider are the defendant’s right in a trial and the

be entitled to reply within a time limit to be set by the Chamber. Subject to the provisions of subrule 2, the Chamber shall then specify the proceedings and manner in which participation is
considered appropriate, which may include making opening and closing statements.”
28
Rule 89(1)
29
Article 68(3) and Rule 91(3)(b)
30
Preamble of ICC states that the Court is “determined to put an end to the impunity for the
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes,” and has
“resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice.”
31
Article 68(1) of the ICC Statute states: “The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect
the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses.
In so doing, the Court shall have regard to all relevant factors, including age, gender as defined
in article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and the nature of the crime, in particular, but not limited to,
where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or violence against children. The Prosecutor
shall take measures particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such crimes. These
measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and
impartial trial.” See also Article 68(5).
32
ICC Rule 90(1): “A victim shall be free to choose a legal representative.
33
J. Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation, Oxford University Press,
(Oxford, 2002).
9

main purpose of the ICC: maintain efficient fair proceedings for those accused of international
crimes.
Victims need protection and rights in the throughout a proceeding, but when restorative
justice becomes the overreaching goal, then it not only clouds the original purpose of
international courts,34 but establishes bad precedent for the Court in the future, and ultimately
violates the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial. The goal of the ICC is to prosecute
international war crimes. When these pro-victim initiatives impeded on the defendant’s right to
a fair trial and due process rights then the pro-victim initiatives go too far. The ability to receive
separate legal representation throughout the entirety of the trial and the ability to have complete
anonymity violates the defendant’s right to a fair trial, and is ultimately, unnecessary in order to
achieve the true goal of the ICC: to put an end to grave international crimes.

III. VICTIM’S ABILITY TO HAVE LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Under Rule 90, a victim is entitled to legal representation.35 This marked the first time in
an international proceeding that victims were granted this extraordinary and controversial right.
Proponents of this rule argue that without victim participation and their legal representatives,
“the trial is a confrontation between… the international community and the other who claims
being the representative of his people,”36 while opponents characterize the rule as an invitation

34

Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach.
American Journal of International Law. April 2012.
35
ICC Rule 90(1).
36
Luc Walleyn, attorney for victims in Lubanga’s Trial. Interview by Mairagala Wakabi.
January 13,2010. http://www.lubangatrial.org/201/01/13/qa-with-luc-walleyn-lawyer-forvictims-in-lubanga’s-trial/,
10

by the ICC to allow a second set of prosecutors at the trial.37

Although, having legal

representation enables victims to effectively participate in their trial as their own entity, allowing
them to participate in every aspect of the trial, including cross-examining witnesses, will lead to
procedural injustice to the defendant and a violation of a defendant’s right to a fair trial.

A. Victim Participation in the ICC and the Effect of Having Legal Representation
Granting victims the ability to attain separate legal representation was a monumental step
in favor of victim’s rights and restorative justice.38 Neither the ICTY or the ICTR had an
equivalent clause.39 The purpose of this legal representation clause is: “to ensure that victims are
able to fully exercise their right to participate in ICC proceedings…”40 However, this can be
accomplished without having their legal representatives participate in every proceeding that the
prosecution and defense does.41
The ICC has two distinct bodies devoted to providing support to victims who interact
with the Court: the Victims Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS) and the Office of
Public Counsel for Victims (OPVC).42 The OPVC provides support and assistance to the legal

37

Garkawe, S., Victims and the International Criminal Court Three Major Issues, 3 International
Criminal Law Review 359-60 (2003).
38
See, e.g., Emily Haaslam, Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph
of Hope Over Experience?, The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy
Issues, 315 Dominic McGoldrick, et al., eds., (2004) (noting that the Rome Statute marked a
departure in traditional criminal justice theory towards a “more expansive model of international
criminal law that encompasses social welfare and restorative justice.”)
39
See Tochilovsky V, “Rule of Procedure For the International Criminal Court: Problems to
Address in Light of the Experience of the Ad Hoc Tribunals” XLVI Netherlands International
Law Review 343 (1999).
40
Objective 4 of the ICC Strategy.
41
ICC Rule 91 – Only victims assisted by legal representatives enjoy the specific enhanced
procedural rights which go beyond the right to participate in hearings.
42
Susan SaCouto, Ensuring Effective and Efficient Representation of Victims at the International
Criminal Court, War Crimes Research Office, 12 (December 2011).
11

representatives of the victims, while the VRPC is in charge of the procedural issues, including
determining who the legal representatives should be. In order to qualify as a legal representative
of the victims, the attorney must meet the same qualifications that counsel for the defense must
demonstrate: competence in the international or criminal law and procedure, and excellent
knowledge and be fluent in one of the working languages of the Court.43
The rule states that a victim shall be free to choose a legal representative, but if there are
a number of victims, the Chamber may request that victims or groups of victims choose a
common legal representative.44 In an international criminal case, there will likely be a high
number of victims. Individual victim representation must be balanced with “the important
practical, financial, infrastuructal and logistical constraints faced by the Court.”45 When the
Court determines that an effective trial and efficiency outweigh the victim’s right to have every
victim obtain individual representation, the Chamber will request the victims to choose a
common legal representative.46 Having a common legal representative allows the Court to group
victims together. If victims are unable to choose a legal representative or lack the necessary
means to pay for a common legal representative, the Chamber shall facilitate the process by
requesting the VRPC to choose one or more common legal representatives and provide
appropriate legal assistance.47 A common legal representative has OPVC support staff at their

43

Rule 22(1) – Appointment and Qualifications of Counsel for the Defense.
Rule 90(1) and Rule 90(2). In Lubanga, victims were largely represented by counsel of their
own choosing throughout the proceeding.
45
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case. No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Trial Chamber II, Order on the Organisation of Common Legal Representation of Victims, pg.
11 (July 22, 2009).
46
See Rule 90(2).
47
See Rule 90(3) and 90(5).
44
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disposal both at the ICC’s location in the Hauge and on the ground in the relevant locale for the
case, talking to and supporting the victims.48
Although, a victim has a statutory right to participate in hearings, pre-trial and trial
proceedings, and questioning witnesses; this right is not automatic, as participation will
ultimately be determined on a case-by-case basis.49 In order to participate or attend a hearing or
question a witness, the legal representative of the victim must submit a written application to the
Court. Ultimately, participation of victims should be consolidated to the largest extent possible
in order to ensure certainty and consistency for victims themselves. The Court then has the
ability to grant, deny, or be confined to written observations or submission, or in the case of
questioning witnesses, provide a note of questioning witnesses.50 In making this determination,
the Court must consider a variety of factors, including: the stage of the proceedings, the rights of
the accused, the interests of witnesses, and the need for a fair, impartial and expeditious trial in
order to give full effect to Article 68(3).51 In Lubanga, the Court considered these factors in
making its determination about the legal representatives participating in the proceeding, the

48

There are currently offices of ICC outreach in four countries (Uganda, Central African
Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Chad) that work with victims.
49
Rule 91 – Participation of Legal Representatives in the Proceedings.
50
Rule 91(3)(a): “When a legal representative attends and participates in accordance with this
rule, and wishes to question a witness, including questioning under rules 67 and 68, an expert or
the accused, the legal representative must make application to the Chamber. The Chamber may
require the legal representative to provide a written note of the questions and in that case the
questions shall be communicated to the Prosecutor and, if appropriate, the defense, who shall be
allowed to make observations within a time limit set by the Chamber.”
51

Rule 91(3)(b): “The Chamber shall then issue a ruling on the request, taking into account the
stage of the proceedings, the rights of the accused, the interests of witnesses, the need for a fair,
impartial and expeditious trial and in order to give effect to article 68, paragraph 3. The ruling
may include directions on the manner and order of the questions and the production of
documents in accordance with the powers of the Chamber under article 64. The Chamber may, if
it considers it appropriate, put the question to the witness, expert or accused on behalf of the
victim’s legal representative.”
13

extent they would participate and, ultimately, the amount of success they would have
representing their clients.

B. Legal Representation in the Lubanga Trial
In Lubanga, 129 victims participated in the trial. “Victims” in this case were defined as
“children who were recruited and/or actively used as child soldiers” as well as “the children’s
parents or next of kin who are able to demonstrate harm suffered on account of the recruitment
of their children” and “individuals who may have suffered as a result of intervening to prevent
the commission of the crimes” (other individuals pillaged, killed, or raped by FPLC rebel forces
were not granted victim status).52

Eight different legal representatives, including Paolina

Massidda, the Principal Counsel of the Office of the Public Counsel for Victims at the ICC,
represented different groups of victims.53
Being the first trial under the ICC, both the Office of The Prosecutor (OTP) and the
defense were reluctant when it came to victim participation and the use of legal representatives,
fearing that their participation would disrupt the trial, abuse procedures and lead to an unfair trial
for the accused.54 Despite the angst towards the victim’s legal representatives, the eight always

52

The children’s parents or next of kin who were able to demonstrate harm suffered on account
of the recruitment of their children were also considered victims, as well as individuals who may
have suffered as a result of intervening to prevent the commission of the crimes; see Appeals
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defense against Trial Chamber
I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, July 11, 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432,
par. 31.
53
Susan SaCouto, Ensuring Effective and Efficient Representation of Victims at the International
Criminal Court, War Crimes Research Office, 3 (December 2011).
54
Luc Walleyn, attorney for victims in Lubanga’s Trial. Interview by Mairagala Wakabi.
January 13, 2010. http://www.lubangatrial.org/201/01/13/qa-with-luc-walleyn-lawyer-forvictims-in-lubanga’s-trial/,
14

attended the court hearings and pre-trial and trial proceedings.55 In every court appearance, each
stressed upon the harm caused to children during the conflict and abuses they faced in military
training camps.56
The legal representatives also made grand attempts to attach additional charges of sexual
slavery and cruel and unusual punishment to Lubanga, and their petitioning to the court to allow
three of the victims to give their opinions in court. Lubanga was initially charged with enlisting
underage children in the UPC. In May 22, 2009, victims participating in the trial filed a motion
arguing that the evidence that came out during the trial, specifically that fifteen of the victims
were young girls that were allegedly raped, warranted the additional charges of sexual slavery
and inhumane treatment. On December 8, 2009, after months delay, the Trial Chamber judges
announced the decision to not allow any additional charges.57
Furthermore, triggered by the request made by the victims’ legal representative, Joseph
Keta, the Court allowed for three victims to testify, not on behalf of the prosecution, but as
separate entities imparting their views on the Court. Two of the victims were former child
soldiers, and testified to their experience in the UPC. While the other was a school teacher who
described his indirect experiences dealing with the UPC and the FLPC.

55

In makings its

REDESS, Thomas Lubanga Trial: Timeline of Victims’ Engagement (March 14, 2012). The
legal representatives participated in the trial form January 26, 2009, when the eight lawyers each
made opening statements on behalf of their victims to May 20, 2011, when the victims submitted
their final observations. The legal representatives are still currently participating in the
negotiations of reparations.
56
Briefing Paper: The Trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo at the ICC, Open Society: Justice
Initiative. www.lubangatrial.org (March 2012). Specifically, in their openings, some of the
representatives noted that the chamber should reject the defense’s portrayal of Lubanga as a mere
accomplice to these the crimes charged and went even further, stating Lubanga should be found
guilty as a direct perpetrator in addition to the co-perpetrator liability requested by the
prosecution.
57
After the prosecution closed its case in July 2009, the Trial Chamber judges initially ruled in
favor of the victims’ motion in considering new charges. This decision was reversed.
15

determination, the judges made note that there was a distinction in victims “expressing their
views and concerns” and victims “giving evidence.”58

Victims who gave evidence were

witnesses for the prosecution. These three separate victims were merely providing information
in order to help the judges in their approach to the evidence presented by both the prosecution
and the defense. In detailing the experience, the Court made sure to tell the legal representatives
that they expected them to properly prepare the victims to in order to ensure that their views
were properly presented. What the victims testified to and the specific procedure the legal
representative and victims went through is unclear based on the records and the manuscripts
from the ICC proceedings. However, on December 10, 2010, the identity of two of the victims
who testified came under question. Given the material doubts of their identities, the Court,
ultimately, chose not to rely on their identities.59
The Lubanga trial demonstrated that allowing victims to have separate legal
representation throughout the entire course of the proceedings, including having the ability to
cross examine witnesses, file motions and petition for victims to present their view to court, is
unnecessary as it had a minimal effect on the trial. In this case, the Court demonstrated that it is
weary about granting the victims’ counsel any power that would violate the due process rights of
the defendant. This hesitation by the Justices is warranted. However, even the victims’ legal
representatives ability to be present and participate in every proceedings violates the defendant’s
international due process rights and right to a fair trial.

58

Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeal, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06 (August 6, 2008).
59
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra, note 1.
16

C. Why Having a Legal Representative Throughout the Entire Proceeding Violates Due Process
of the Defendant.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) sets forth the
international standard of due process.60 The ICCPR states “all persons shall be equal before the
court and tribunals,”61 and shall be entitled to minimum guarantees, including the right “to be
tried without undue delay.”62 Read in conjunction with Article 68 of the ICC, which states that
victim participation and their legal representatives are warranted as long as it is “not prejudicial
to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial,”63 the ICC makes
clear that a defendant’s due process is important to the Court. However, the mere presence of
the legal representatives violate both of these bedrock principles and is contrary to basic
understandings of the criminal justice system.
Unlike the longstanding right of defendants to a just trial with due process, the right of
alleged victims to participate and have legal representation in proceedings is a new concept in
international criminal law. Having essentially a second prosecutorial wing in the courtroom
violates the defendants right to a fair trial, as the defendant is essentially being attacked from two
different sides of the same coin. This is not fair under the fair trial clause in Article 68. Even if
the prosecutors official role is not to the victim, in prosecuting the defendant and in their attempt
to build a case, the prosecutor fulfills much of the victims concerns in terms of charging the
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defendant with the appropriate crime, assigning witnesses to the case and seeking a just
punishment for the defendant.
Other than the ICC, no other criminal court allows for victims to have legal
representation. Whether the system is inquisitorial, like in the majority of European states, or
adversarial, like in the United States and Ireland, domestic jurisdictions understand the necessity
of maintaining balance in the courtroom.64 The ICC’s restorative approach stems from the
inquisitorial criminal system that allows for victims to have standing participating in the
courtroom.65 The main reason for allowing victims to participate in an inquisitorial criminal
system is because a civil claim for compensation is directly integrated into the criminal
proceedings, enabling the criminal victim to simultaneously act as civil claimants.66 In an
adversarial system, where civil and criminal matters are in two separate cases, the victim plays
no role in the criminal proceeding.
Following the inquisitorial approach, which the ICC is patterned off of, the only time
victims should be allowed to be represented in the ICC are at the conclusion of criminal matters,
specifically during the reparation proceedings, when the criminal court turns to the civil matter
of compensating victims. Allowing the victims to have legal representation during the “criminal
aspect of the trial” is unprecedented in any jurisdiction, and clouds the primary purpose of
criminal law: to convict or acquit the accused. Furthermore, Lubanga demonstrates that legal
representatives during the “criminal portion” of the proceedings will have very little impact,
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acting more as intermediaries between the Court and the victims because of the Court’s fear of
violating the defendant’s due process.67
Reparations, however, go “beyond the notion of punitive justice, towards a solution
which is more inclusive, encourages participation and recognizes the need to provide effective
remedies for victim.”68 Lawyers for victims should be able to participate in this discussion
because it is at this stage that the ICC turns more into a civil matter, as the primary purpose of
reparations are to compensate the victims themselves. In Lubanga, specifically, the Court stated
that the reparation proceeding will be an inclusive process centered around interviewing and
consulting victims.69 Since, the main objective of the reparations is to compensate the victims,
rather than prosecute the defendant, legal representation is necessary during this portion of the
proceedings and more importantly does not violate the defendant’s international due process.

IV. VICTIM’S ABILITY TO BE GRANTED COMPLETE ANYONOMITY
Along with the right of legal representation, the defendant’s due process and right to a fair
trial are also violated in the Court’s ability to grant victims complete anonymity, including from
the defense. Recognizing the peril and risks that victims and witnesses place themselves in when
offering testimony and evidence to the prosecutors in all stages of the proceedings, international
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courts have traditionally put in place protective measures for those who come before the court.70
The ICC has also recognized that victim and witness protection is necessary in order to have
victims and witnesses come forward in establishing a case against the accused during the
investigative, pretrial and trial. However, the ICC takes this protection too far, granting victims
the ability to receive total anonymity without disclosing their appearance to the defense.71

A. The ICC’s Ability to Grant Complete Anonymity
To allow a victim to receive total anonymity is a violation of the accused’s due process and
a violation of Article 68’s fair trial clause.72 Article 68(1) states that the court may take
“appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and
privacy of victims and witnesses.” Article 68(5) states that one of the measures a prosecutor is
entitled to is the ability to withhold disclosure of evidence and grant total anonymity if this may
lead to “grave endangerment” of a victim or his or her family.73 This ability denies the accused a
fair trial in that it prohibits the accused from confronting the victim or witness, and may lead to
the conviction of accused persons on the basis of tainted evidence.
Traditional “in court” protective measures sufficiently protect the victims and witnesses
without violating the defendant’s due process.
70
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distortion, the use of pseudonyms, voice distortion, private sessions, closed sessions, use of a
remote witness room, video-link testimony and safe conduct.74 These measures have the effect
of protecting witnesses by excluding certain identifying features about the victim from the press
and the public, but not from the defense.
The ICC is not the first international court to grant this right to anonymity,75 and to receive
harsh criticism because of it.76 The ICTY also had a provision that allowed the prosecution to
seek total anonymity for a victim or witness.77 In making its determination the ICTY considered
five factors: the fear for the safety of the witness and his or her family, importance of testimony
of the particular witness, the trial chamber satisfaction that there is no prima facie evidence that
the witness is untrustworthy, lack of an effective witness protection program, and lack of ability
to apply any less restrictive measures.78 In making its determination as to whether or not a
victim is entitled to receive protective measures or the level of protection a victim shall receive,
the ICC involves itself in a similar balancing test that the ICTY did, considering the victim’s age,
gender, health, the nature of the crime and if the crime involves crime against sexual or gender
violence or crimes against children.79
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In determining whether or not a victim is entitled to this egregious benefit, the Court must
ultimately balance two important objectives: protection of a witnesses versus fair trial of accused
persons. By favoring the former, the ICC simultaneously loses its legitimacy and violates
defendant’s right to a fair trial. As seen in Lubanga, the ICC is weary to apply this extreme
protective measure in fear of those potential outcomes.

B. The Use of Protective Measures in the Lubanga Trial
In Lubanga, the Court did grant anonymity to many of the victims, but did so with
restrictions based on the different times of the trial. This is a tactic has been used by the Court
since then.80

In Lubanga, during Pre-Trial Chamber I, anonymity came with restricted

modalities of participation, such as victims were not entitled to submit evidence during the
confirmation of charge hearing in the case.81 The Trial Chamber I then removed any categorical
limitations on the modalities of participation by anonymous victims, but recognized that “[w]hile
the security of victims is a central responsibility of the Court, their participation in the
proceedings cannot be allowed to undermine the fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. The
greater the extent and the significance of the proposed participation, the more likely it will be
that the Chamber will require the victim to identify himself or herself.”82
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Although the Court employed a limited application of the anonymity clause, the perils of
applying this rule, specifically the potential for tainted evidence and doubts of victim or witness
identification, were still present in this case. The three victims who presented their views in the
Court only had voice and face distortion and were referred to by an identification number, rather
then their name.83 However, almost eleven months after they testified in December 2010, the
identities of the victims were being questioned. The Court, in taking a cautious approach chose
not to rely on the opinions of the three victims who presented their views in court because of “the
material doubts that exist[ed] as to the identities of two of these individuals, which inevitably
affect the third.”84 The Chamber decided to withdraw the permission originally granted to them
to participate as victims.
The Lubanga trial demonstrates that even when the Court applies a restricted form of the
anonymity clause or similar forms of protection, abuse is still possible. The Court understands
this, and is taking an extremely conservative approach granting total anonymity. This is good,
and is how the ICTR and ICTY applied their similar statute.

Yet, despite the restrictive

application of the rule and the importance of protecting victims and witnesses, the ability to
employ the total anonymity clause should not be available in the Court because its use without
any restrictions would violate the defendant’s due process and right to a fair trial.

C. Why Having a Total Anonymity in ICC violates Due Process of the Defendant.
Under Article 68, victims have the ability to present views and concerns to the ICC in a
manner, which is not prejudicial to, or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair or
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impartial trial.85 The requirements of a fair trial include a public hearing in which the accused
has the opportunity “[t]o examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the came conditions as witnesses
against him.”86 This right to a fair trial is paramount, as it establishes the legitimacy of the
Court. This is vital and cannot waver, based on the context of each case. Although protections
for victims are necessary, when the level of protection, such as granting complete anonymity to
the victim, rise to the level where it is prejudicial to the rights of the accused, then it violates the
international standard of due process and fair trial.
In the past, in order to adhere to the defendants right to a fair trial, prior tribunals have
employed the same restrictive approach that the ICC employed in Lubanga. For example, the
European Court in Kostovski v. The Netherlands, concluded that the disadvantages that an
accused must face when addressing the evidence of an anonymous witness can be
counterbalanced by the safeguards provided by the trial court.87 However, as the Lubanga trial
demonstrates even when there are safeguards in place, such as extremely diligent research into
the identification of the victim and restrictive use of anonymity, the potential for the lack of a fair
trial still exists.
The right to a fair trial is not a malleable one, which can be determined in the context of
every situation, as some scholars have argued.88 Pro-victim initiatives gained at the expense of
the offenders violate the accused’s right to a fair trial even when these restrictive measures are in
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place because every defendant has the right to examine or cross-examine adverse witness or
victim.89

Without knowing the identity of the victims, including the name, background,

residence and whereabouts of the alleged crime, the defendant’s right to a fair trial is breached.
Pro-victim initiatives that blatantly affect the rights of the accused cannot be tolerated, as the
right to a fair trial is a fundamental cornerstone of the ICC in order to maintain a sense of
legitimacy for the Court.90 The defendant is innocent until proven given guilty, and according to
Rule 68, has the right to a fair trial, which includes the ability to cross-examine witnesses. If the
court grants complete anonymity to victims without restrictions, then this right is violated.

V. CONCLUSION
The ICC must “establish itself as the preeminent defender of human rights and
particularly of the right of every accused to a fair trial according to the most exacting standards
of due process required by contemporary international law.”91 Moving forward, it is not enough
for the Court to employ these victim protection provisions restrictively as the defendant’s right to
a fair trial and the defendant’s due process rights are not some rules that can be changed based on
the context of each case. Rather due process and the right to a fair trial are fundamental to the
existence and reputation of the court. Although restorative justice should play a role in ICC
89
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proceedings, it cannot be the overriding principle during the criminal proceedings. Rather,
victims should only have the ability to have legal representation during the reparation portion of
the proceeding, once the conviction of the accused is final; and the use of total anonymity should
never be employed, especially without restrictions.
In enacting these broad victim protective measures in the ICC laws, the ICC shows its
hand in favoring the victims or the accused. In order to have a reputation as an unbiased legal
arena, the Court must abandon the victim’s ability to have legal representation at all trial
proceedings and the Court’s ability to grant victim’s total anonymity without restrictions.
Failure to do so will lead to an unfair trial, a violation of defendant’s due process, and a growing
sense of weariness towards the Court.
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